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Abstract
While every instance of the Hospitals/Residents problem admits a stable matching, the
problem with lower quotas (HR-LQ) has instances with no stable matching. For such an
instance, we expect the existence of an envy-free matching, which is a relaxation of a stable
matching preserving a kind of fairness property.
In this paper, we investigate the existence of an envy-free matching in several settings,
in which hospitals have lower quotas and not all doctor-hospital pairs are acceptable. We
first provide an algorithm that decides whether a given HR-LQ instance has an envy-free
matching or not. Then, we consider envy-freeness in the Classified Stable Matching model
due to Huang (2010), i.e., each hospital has lower and upper quotas on subsets of doctors.
We show that, for this model, deciding the existence of an envy-free matching is NP-hard
in general, but solvable in polynomial time if quotas are paramodular.
1 Introduction
Since the seminal work of Gale and Shapley [11], the Hospitals/Residents problem (HR, for
short), or the College Admission problem, has been studied extensively [14, 21, 30]. They
proposed an algorithm that finds a stable matching in linear time for every instance. In this
problem, each hospital has an upper quota for the number of doctors assigned to it. In some
applications, each hospital also has a lower quota for the number of doctors it receives. That
is, we want to consider the Hospitals/Residents problem with lower quotas (HR-LQ, for short).
Unfortunately, for HR-LQ, we cannot ensure the existence of a stable matching. However, it is
easy to decide whether there is a stable matching or not for a given HR-LQ instance, because
the number of doctors assigned to each hospital is identical for any stable matching (according
to the well-known Rural Hospitals Theorem [12, 27, 28, 29]).
When a given HR-LQ instance has no stable matching, one natural approach is to weaken
stability concept while preserving some kind of fairness. Envy-freeness [33] (also called fairness
in the school choice literature [8, 13]) of matchings is a relaxation of stability obtained by giving
up efficiency. Similarly to stability, envy-freeness forbids the existence of a doctor who has
justified envy toward some other doctor, but it tolerates the existence of a doctor who claims
a hospital’s vacant seat. The importance of envy-freeness and its variants has recently been
recognized in the context of constrained matching [8, 13, 19, 20, 4], and structural properties
of envy-free matchings were investigated in [33].
Envy-free matchings naturally arise when we find a matching in the following ad hoc manner.
For an HR-LQ instance, suppose that we find a stable matching while disregarding the lower
quotas, and that the obtained matching does not meet the lower quotas. Let us reduce the
upper quotas of hospitals that receive many doctors, and again find a stable matching while
disregarding the lower quotas, and repeat. If we find a stable matching that meets the lower
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quotas after repeating such adjustments, then the obtained matching is an envy-free matching
of the original instance (see Proposition 2.4).
Because an envy-free matching is a relaxation of a stable matching, it is more likely to
exist. Indeed, if all doctor-hospital pairs are acceptable and the sum of lower quotas of all
hospitals does not exceed the number of doctors, then we can ensure the existence of an envy-
free matching. (This follows from the results of Fragiadakis et al. [8]). However, if not all
pairs are acceptable, then even an envy-free matching may fail to exist. Moreover, deciding the
existence of an envy-free matching is not so simple because envy-free matchings have different
sizes unlike stable matchings.
Our Contribution In this paper, we study envy-free matchings for the HR-LQ model and
its generalizations. In our models, not all doctor-hospital pairs are acceptable (i.e., preference
lists are incomplete).
We first investigate envy-free matchings in the setting of HR-LQ. We provide the following
characterization of the existence of an envy-free matching. Let I be a given HR-LQ instance
and let I ′ be an HR instance obtained from I by removing lower quotas and replacing upper
quotas with the original lower quotas. We prove that I has an envy-free matching if and only
if every hospital is full in a stable matching of I ′ (Theorem 2.6). Combined with the rural
hospitals theorem, this characterization yields an efficient algorithm to decide the existence of
an envy-free matching for an HR-LQ instance. That is, we can decide it by finding a stable
matching for the HR instance whose upper quotas are the original lower quotas, and checking
whether all hospitals are full or not.
Next, we move to a generalized model, in which each hospital imposes an upper and a lower
quota on each subset of doctors. That is, we consider an envy-free matching version of Huang’s
Classified Stable Matching [18] (CSM, for short). (See “Related Works” below for results on
stable matchings of CSM and its generalizations.) In Huang’s original model, each hospital has
a family of sets of doctors, called classes, and each class has an upper and a lower quota. We
formulate this setting by letting each hospital have a pair of set functions defined on the set of
acceptable doctors. These two functions respectively represent upper quotas and lower quotas.
For this model, we show that it is NP-hard to decide the existence of an envy-free matching,
even if the number of non-trivial quotas is linear (Theorem 2.6). The proof is by a reduction
from the NP-complete problem (3,B2)-SAT [2].
Then, we provide a tractable special case of CSM. We show that if the pair of lower and
upper quota functions of each hospital is paramodular [9] (see Section 4 for the definition), then
we can decide the existence of an envy-free matching in polynomial time. This means that the
problem is tractable if the family of acceptable doctor sets forms a generalized matroid for each
hospital. A generalized matroid [31] (also called an M\-convex family [24]) is a family of subsets
satisfying a certain axiom called the exchange axiom. It is known that a paramodular function
pair defines a generalized matroid and vice versa. Because constraints defined on a laminar (or
hierarchical) family yield a generalized matroid, our tractable special case includes a case in
which each hospital defines quotas on a laminar family of doctors.
Related Works Recently, the study of matching models with lower quotas has developed
substantially [1, 7, 13, 15, 16, 18, 21, 22]. The Hospitals/Residents problem with lower quotas
(HR-LQ) was first studied by Hamada et al. [15, 16], who considered the minimization of the
number of blocking pairs subject to upper and lower quotas. They showed the NP-hardness
of the problem, gave an inapproximability result, and provided an exponential-time exact algo-
rithm. Motivated by the matching scheme used in Hungary’s higher education sector, Biro´ et
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al. [3] considered a version of HR-LQ in which hospitals (i.e., colleges) are allowed to be closed,
i.e., each hospital is assigned enough doctors or no doctor. They showed the NP-completeness
to decide the existence of a stable matching.
The Classified Stable Matching problem (CSM), proposed by Huang [18], is a generalization
of HR-LQ without hospital closures. In this model, each hospital (or institute, in Huang’s
terminology) has a classification of doctors (i.e., applicants) based on their expertise and gives
an upper and lower quota for each class. Huang showed that it is NP-complete in general to
decide the existence of a stable matching, and proved that it is solvable in polynomial time if
classes form a laminar family. For this tractable special case, Fleiner and Kamiyama [7] gave a
concise explanation in terms of matroids, and their framework is generalized by Yokoi [34] to a
framework with generalized matroids.
To cope with the nonexistence of a stable matching in constrained matching models (not only
models with lower quotas but also with other types of constraints such as regional constraints),
several relaxations of stability have been proposed. See, e.g., Kamada and Kojima [19, 20],
Fragiadakis et al. [8], and Goto et al. [13]. Envy-freeness is one of them that places emphasis
on fairness rather than efficiency. Fragiadakis et al. [8] provided a strategy-proof algorithm that
always finds an envy-free matching (or fair matching, in their terminology) of HR-LQ under the
assumption that all doctor-hospital pairs are acceptable. The outcome of their mechanism also
fulfills a second-best efficiency (i.e., nonwastefulness) property. Their framework is generalized
in Goto et al. [13] so that regional quotas can be handled.
Here we compare our models with the above models. Unlike the models of Goto et al. [13]
and Kamada and Kojima [19, 20], our models cannot handle regional quotas. Instead, our CSM
model (in Sections 3 and 4) allows each hospital to have quotas on classes of doctors, which
are not dealt with in their models. The setting of a tractable special case of CSM described
in Section 4 is equivalent to a many-to-one case of Yokoi’s model [34], which studied stable
matchings. Neither [34] nor the study in this paper relies on the results of the other, while both
of them utilize the matroid framework of Fleiner [5, 6].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 investigates envy-free match-
ings in the Hospitals/Residents problem with lower quotas (HR-LQ). In Section 3, we define an
envy-free matching in the classified stable matching (CSM) model, and show the NP-hardness
of its existence test. As its tractable special case, Section 4 presents results on CSM with
paramodular quota functions. Proofs for the theorems and corollary in Section 4 are provided
in the Appendix.
2 Envy-freeness in HR with lower quotas
In this section, we investigate envy-free matchings in the Hospitals/Residents problem with
lower quotas (HR-LQ).
There are two disjoint sets D and H, which represent doctors and hospitals, respectively. A
set of acceptable doctor-hospital pairs is denoted by E ⊆ D ×H.
For each doctor d ∈ D, its acceptable hospital set is denoted by
A(d) := {h ∈ H | (d, h) ∈ E } ⊆ H,
and d has a preference list (strict order) d on A(d). Similarly, for each hospital h ∈ H,
A(h) := { d ∈ D | (d, h) ∈ E } ⊆ D,
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and h has a preference h on A(h). Each hospital h has a lower quota lh ∈ Z and an upper
quota uh ∈ Z with
0 ≤ lh ≤ uh ≤ |A(h)|.
We call a tuple I = (D,H,E,DH , {(lh, uh)}h∈H) an HR-LQ instance, where DH is an
abbreviated notation for the union of {d}d∈D and {h}h∈H . In particular, if lh = 0 for all
h ∈ H, we call it an HR instance. An arbitrary subset M of E is called an assignment. For
any assignment M , we denote M(d) = {h ∈ A(d) | (d, h) ∈M } for each d ∈ D and M(h) =
{ d ∈ A(h) | (d, h) ∈M } for each h ∈ H. If |M(d)| = 1, the notation M(d) is also used to refer
its single element.
An assignment M is called a matching (or, said to be feasible) if |M(d)| ≤ 1 for each
d ∈ D and lh ≤ |M(h)| ≤ uh for each h ∈ H. In a matching M , a doctor d is unassigned
(resp., assigned) if M(d) = ∅ (resp., |M(d)| = 1), and h is undersubscribed (resp., full) if
|M(h)| < uh (resp., |M(h)| = uh).
Definition 2.1. For a matching M , an unassigned pair (d, h) ∈ E \M is a blocking pair if
(i) d is unassigned or h d M(d), and (ii) h is undersubscribed or there is d′ ∈ M(h) with
d h d′. A matching M is stable if there is no blocking pair.
For an HR instance, it is known that the algorithm of Gale and Shapley [11] always finds a
stable matching. The set of stable matchings has the following property.
Proposition 2.2 (“Rural Hospitals” Theorem [12, 27, 29]). For a given HR instance, any
two stable matchings M,M ′ satisfy |M(h)| = |M ′(h)| for every h ∈ H. Moreover M(h) = M ′(h)
if h is undersubscribed in M or M ′.
As mentioned in the Introduction, if hospitals have lower quotas, then we cannot guarantee
the existence of a stable matching anymore. By Proposition 2.2, however, we can easily check the
existence by finding a stable matching while disregarding lower quotas, and checking whether
the obtained matching meets lower quotas.
For an instance that has no stable matching, we want to obtain some matching that still has
a kind of fairness. As a relaxation of the concept of stability, envy-freeness (also called fairness)
of matchings has been proposed [8, 33].
Definition 2.3. For a matching M , a doctor d has justified envy toward d′ with M(d′) = h
if (i) d is unassigned or h d M(d) and (ii) d h d′. A matching M is envy-free if no doctor
has justified envy.
Note that, if d has justified envy toward d′ with M(d) = h, then it means that (d, h) is a
blocking pair. Thus, stability implies envy-freeness. The envy-freeness of a matching is also
regarded as the stability with reduced upper quotas, as follows.
Proposition 2.4. For I = (D,H,E,DH , {(lh, uh)}h∈H), an assignment M is an envy-free
matching if and only if M is a stable matching of I ′ = (D,H,E,DH , {(lh, u′h)}h∈H) for some
{u′h}h∈H with u′h ≤ uh (h ∈ H).
Proof. The “if” part is clear because feasibility in I ′ implies that in I, and stability implies
envy-freeness. For the “only if” part, suppose that M is envy-free in I and set u′h := |M(h)| for
each h ∈ H. Then, M is feasible for I ′ and all hospitals are full, and hence there is no doctor
who claims a hospital’s vacant seat. Because M is envy-free, it is stable in I ′.
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By Proposition 2.4, to check whether we can obtain a stable matching by reducing upper
quotas, it suffices to check for the existence of an envy-free matching.
Under the assumption that all doctor-hospital pairs are acceptable and the sum of lower
quotas does not exceed the number of doctors, Fragiadakis et al. [8] provided a strategy-proof
mechanism that always finds an envy-free matching. As a corollary, we have the following.
Proposition 2.5. For an instance I = (D,H,E,DH , {(lh, uh)}h∈H) such that E = D × H
and |D| ≥∑h∈H lh, there exists an envy-free matching.
However, if not all pairs are acceptable, then even an envy-free matching may not exist.
Figure 1 shows an instance with D = {d1, d2}, H = {h1, h2}, E = {(d1, h1), (d2, h1), (d2, h2)},
lh1 = lh2 = 1, and uh1 = uh2 = 2. For this instance, M = {(d1, h1), (d2, h2)} is the unique
feasible matching, but it is not envy-free because d2 has justified envy toward d1. Hence, there
is no envy-free matching.
Doctor’s preferences Hospitals’ preferences
d1 : h1 h1 : d2 d1 (lh1 = 1, uh1 = 2)
d2 : h1 h2 h2 : d2 (lh2 = 1, uh2 = 2)
Figure 1: An instance of HR-LQ with no envy-free matching
Note that an envy-free matching does exist if there is no lower quota, because empty match-
ing is clearly envy-free. Therefore, the existence test of an envy-free matching is non-trivial
when incomplete lists and lower quotas are introduced simultaneously. Here we provide a char-
acterization.
Theorem 2.6. I = (D,H,E,DH , {(lh, uh)}h∈H) has an envy-free matching if and only if some
stable matching M ′ of the HR instance I ′ = (D,H,E,DH , {(0, lh)}h∈H) satisfies |M ′(h)| = lh
for all h ∈ H.
Proof. For the “if” part, let M ′ be a stable matching of I ′ satisfying |M ′(h)| = lh for all h ∈ H.
Then, M ′ is feasible for I ′ and no doctor has justified envy because M ′ has no blocking pair.
Thus, M ′ is an envy-free matching of I.
For the “only if” part, assume that I has an envy-free matching M . Suppose, to the contrary,
a stable matching M ′ of I ′ satisfies |M ′(h∗)| < lh∗ for some h∗ ∈ H. Let us denote N = M \M ′
and N ′ = M ′ \M . For every h ∈ H, because |M ′(h)| ≤ lh ≤ |M(h)|, we have |N ′(h)| ≤ |N(h)|.
In particular, |N ′(h∗)| < |N(h∗)| follows from |M ′(h∗)| < lh∗ .
Consider a bipartite graph G = (D,H;N ∪N ′), i.e., a graph between doctors and hospitals
with edge set N ∪ N ′ = M4M ′. Let G∗ be a connected component of G including h∗, and
denote by D∗ and H∗ the sets of doctors and hospitals in G∗, respectively. Because there is
no edge connecting G∗ and the outside,
∑
d∈D∗ |N(h)| =
∑
h∈H∗ |N(h)| and
∑
d∈D∗ |N ′(h)| =∑
h∈H∗ |N ′(h)|. As |N ′(h∗)| < |N(h∗)| and |N ′(h)| ≤ |N(h)| for any h ∈ H∗, we obtain∑
d∈D∗ |N ′(h)| =
∑
h∈H∗ |N ′(h)| <
∑
h∈H∗ |N(h)| =
∑
d∈D∗ |N(h)|.
Then, there exists d∗ ∈ D∗ with |N ′(d∗)| < |N(d∗)|, which implies N ′(d∗) = ∅ and |N(d∗)| = 1
because N ′ = M ′ \M and N = M \M ′ are subsets of matchings. As G∗ is a connected bipartite
graph, there is a path d0 h0 d1 h1 . . . dk hk with d0 = d
∗ and hk = h∗. Also, as |N(di)| ≤ 1 and
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|N ′(di)| ≤ 1 for i = 0, 1, . . . k, this path alternately uses edges in N = M \M ′ and N ′ = M ′ \M .
Because N ′(d∗) = ∅ and |N(d∗)| = 1, we have
M ′(d0) = ∅,
(di, hi) ∈M \M ′ (i = 0, 1, . . . , k),
(di+1, hi) ∈M ′ \M (i = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1).
The doctor d0 is unassigned in M
′ and finds h0 acceptable because (d0, h0) ∈ M . Hence, the
stability of M ′ implies that h0 prefers d1 ∈M ′(h0) to d0. Then, the envy-freeness of M implies
that d1 prefers h1 = M(d1) to h0. In this way, we obtain
di+1 hi di (i = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1),
hi+1 di+1 hi (i = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1).
Thus, M(dk) = hk dk hk−1 = M ′(dk). Because hk = h∗ satisfies |M ′(hk)| < lhk , then (dk, hk)
is a blocking pair in I ′, which contradicts the stability of M ′.
Theorem 2.6 ensures that the following algorithm decides the existence of an envy-free
matching of an HR-LQ instance I = (D,H,E,DH , {(lh, uh)}h∈H).
Algorithm EF-HR-LQ
Step1. Find a stable matching M ′ of I ′ = (D,H,E,DH , {(0, lh)}h∈H).
Step2. return M ′ if |M ′(h)| = lh for all h ∈ H, and otherwise “there is no envy-free matching.”
Since the Gale-Shapley algorithm finds a stable matching of an HR instance in O(|E|) time,
we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 2.7. For any HR-LQ instance I = (D,H,E,DH , {(lh, uh)}h∈H), the algorithm
EF-HR-LQ decides whether I has an envy-free matching or not in O(|E|) time.
3 Envy-freeness in Classified Stable Matching
In this section, we consider the envy-freeness in a model in which each hospital has lower and
upper quotas on subsets of doctors. This can be regarded as an envy-free matching version of
the Classified Stable Matching, proposed by Huang [18]. Similarly to Section 2, we have doctors
D, hospitals H, acceptable pairs E ⊆ D ×H, and preferences DH .
The only difference from HR-LQ is that, in the current model, each hospital h ∈ H has a
pair of functions ph, qh : 2
A(h) → Z, instead of a pair of numbers lh, uh. These functions define
a lower and an upper quota for each subset of acceptable doctors. Throughout this paper, we
assume that for any hospital h, the functions ph and qh satisfy
0 ≤ ph(B) ≤ qh(B) ≤ |B| (B ⊆ A(h)).
We call such a tuple (D,H,E,DH , {(ph, qh)}h∈H) a CSM instance. For each h ∈ H, the
family of acceptable subsets of doctors is denoted by
F(ph, qh) := {X ⊆ A(h) | ∀B ⊆ A(h) : ph(B) ≤ |X ∩B| ≤ qh(B) } .
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For any h ∈ H, we say that B ⊆ A(h) has a non-trivial lower (resp., upper) constraint if
ph(B) > 0 (resp., qh(B) < |B|). We denote the family of constrained subsets by
C(ph, qh) := {B ⊆ A(h) | ph(B) > 0 or qh(B) < |B| } .
Then, we see that F(ph, qh) is represented as
F(ph, qh) = {X ⊆ A(h) | ∀B ⊆ C(ph, qh) : ph(B) ≤ |X ∩B| ≤ qh(B) } .
For a CSM instance I = (D,H,E,DH , {(ph, qh)}h∈H), M ⊆ E is called a matching (or,
said to be feasible) if |M(d)| ≤ 1 for each d ∈ D and M(h) ∈ F(ph, qh) for each h ∈ H.
Definition 3.1. For a matching M , an unassigned pair (d, h) ∈ E \M is a blocking pair if
(i) d is unassigned or h d M(d), and (ii) M(h) + d ∈ F(ph, qh) or M(h) + d − d′ ∈ F(ph, qh)
for some d′ ∈M(h) with d h d′. A matching M is stable if there is no blocking pair.
In Definition 3.1, the condition M(h) +d ∈ F(ph, qh) means that h can add d to the current
assignment without violating any upper quota, and M(h) +d−d′ ∈ F(ph, qh) means that h can
replace d′ with d without violating any upper or lower quota. The Classified Stable Matching,
introduced by Huang [18], is the problem to decide the existence of a stable matching for a
given CSM instance1. Because this is a generalization of HR-LQ, there are instances that have
no stable matching. Let us consider envy-freeness for a CSM instance.
Definition 3.2. For a matching M , a doctor d has justified envy toward d′ with M(d′) = h
if (i) d is unassigned or h d M(d) and (ii) M(h) + d− d′ ∈ F(ph, qh) and d h d′. A matching
M is envy-free if no doctor has justified envy.
As in the case of HR-LQ, an envy-free matching can be regarded as a stable matching with
reduced upper quotas as follows. For any h ∈ H and k ∈ Z with 0 ≤ k ≤ q(A(h)), a function
q′h : 2
A(h) → Z is called a k-truncation of qh if q′(A(h)) = k and q′(B) = q(B) for every
B ( A(h). Also, we simply say that q′h is a truncation of qh if there is such k ∈ Z.
Proposition 3.3. For I = (D,H,E,DH , {(ph, qh)}h∈H), an assignment M is an envy-free
matching if and only if M is a stable matching of I ′ = (D,H,E,DH , {(ph, q′h)}h∈H) such that
each q′h is some truncation of qh.
Proof. To show the “only if” part, let M be an envy-free matching of I. For each h ∈ H, let
q′h be the |M(h)|-truncation of qh. Then M(h) ∈ F(ph, q′h) and M(h) + d 6∈ F(ph, q′h) for every
d ∈ A(h) \M(h). That is, M is feasible for I ′ and there is no doctor who claims a hospital’s
vacant seat. Therefore, if there is a blocking pair (d, h) ∈ E \M for I ′, it follows that d has a
justified envy toward some d′ with M(d′) = h, which contradicts the envy-freeness of M . Thus,
M is a stable matching of I ′.
For the “if” part, let M be a stable matching of I ′. Clearly, M is feasible for I. Suppose,
to the contrary, some doctor d has justified envy toward d′ with M(d′) = h with respect to I.
Then d is unassigned or h d M(d). Also, we have d h d′ and M(h) + d − d′ ∈ F(ph, qh).
Then, M(h) + d − d′ ∈ F(ph, q′h) follows because |M(h) + d − d′| = |M(h)|. Hence, (d, h) is a
blocking pair in I ′, a contradiction.
1In his original model, each hospital h has a classification Ch ⊆ 2A(h) and sets a lower and an upper quota for
each member of Ch. That is, we are provided C(ph, qh) and the values of ph, qh on it, rather than set functions
ph, qh. Our formulation uses set functions to simplify the arguments in the next section.
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We provide a hardness result for deciding the existence of an envy-free matching. Here, we
assume that evaluation oracles of set functions ph and qh are available for each hospital h.
Theorem 3.4. It is NP-hard to decide whether a CSM instance I = (D,H,E,DH , {(ph, qh)}h∈H)
has an envy-free matching or not. The problem is NP-complete even if the size of C(ph, qh) is
at most 4 for each h ∈ H.
Proof. We use reduction from the NP-complete problem (3, B2)-SAT [2], which is a restriction
of SAT such that each clause contains exactly three literals and each variable occurs exactly
twice as a positive literal and exactly twice as a negative literal. Let ϕ = c1 ∧ c2 ∧ · · · ∧ cm
be an instance of (3, B2)-SAT with Boolean variables v1, v2, . . . , vn. Then, each clause cj is a
disjunction of three literals, (e.g., cj = v1∨¬v2∨¬v3) and each of literals vi and ¬vi appears in
exactly two clauses. For each variable vi, denote by j
∗(i, 1), j∗(i, 2) the indices of two clauses
that contain vi. Similarly, denote by j
∗(i,−1), j∗(i,−2) the indices of clauses that contain ¬vi.
We now define a CSM instance corresponding to ϕ. We have a variable-hospital hi for each
variable vi, and a clause-hospital hj for each clause cj . For each variable vi, we have four doctors
{ di,t | t ∈ {1, 2,−1,−2} }. For each doctor di,t, we have
A(di,t) = {hi, hj∗(i,t)}, hi di,t hj∗(i,t).
The set E is defined as the set of all pairs (di,t, h) such that h ∈ A(di,t). Then, for each
variable-hospital hi and clause-hospital hj , we have
A(hi) = { di,t | t ∈ {1, 2,−1,−2} } ,
A(hj) = { di,t | j∗(i, t) = j } .
Note that di,t ∈ A(hj) implies vi ∈ cj or ¬vi ∈ cj . Also, each of vi ∈ cj and ¬vi ∈ cj implies
di,t ∈ A(hj) for some unique t ∈ {1, 2,−1,−2}. Therefore, |A(hj)| = 3 for each clause-hospital
hj . For each variable-hospital hi, define phi and qhi so that
C(phi , qhi) =
⋃ { {di,t, di,t′} | t ∈ {1, 2}, t′ ∈ {−1,−2} } ,
phi({di,t, di,t′}) = qhi({di,t, di,t′}) = 1 (t ∈ {1, 2}, t′ ∈ {−1,−2}).
Then, we see that F(phi , qhi) = {D+i , D−i }, where D+i := {di,1, di,2} and D−i := {di,−1, di,−2}.
For each clause-hospital hj , define phi and qhi so that
C(phj , qhj ) = {A(hj)}, phj (A(hj)) = 1, qhj (A(hj)) = |A(hj)| = 3.
We define preference lists of hospitals arbitrarily. Note that |C(ph, qh)| ≤ 4 for every hospital.
We show that this CSM instance has an envy-free matching if and only if ϕ = c1 ∧ c2 ∧ · · · ∧ cm
is satisfiable.
The “only if” part: Suppose that there is an envy-free matching M . Then, for every
variable-hospital hi, M(hi) is D
+
i or D
−
i . For each hi, set variable vi to FALSE if M(hi) = D
+
i ,
and to TRUE if M(hi) = D
−
i . This Boolean assignment satisfies every clause cj of ϕ as follows.
Because M(hj) ∈ F(phj , qhj ), we have |M(hj)| ≥ 1. Hence, some di,t with j∗(i, t) = j is assigned
to hj . Then, di,t 6∈M(hi). There are two cases: (i) t ∈ {1, 2}, (ii) t ∈ {−1,−2}. In the case (i),
di,t 6∈M(hi) implies M(hi) 6= D+i , and hence vi is set to TRUE. Also, t ∈ {1, 2} and j∗(i, t) = j
imply vi ∈ cj . Hence, clause cj is satisfied. Similarly, in the case (ii), we see that vi is set to
FALSE and we have ¬vj ∈ cj . Hence, clause cj is satisfied.
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The “if” part: Suppose that there is a Boolean assignment satisfying ϕ. Define an assign-
ment M so that
• M(hi) = D−i if vi is TRUE, and M(hi) = D+i if vi is FALSE, and
• M(hj) = { di,t ∈ A(hj) | di,t ∈ D+i , vi is TRUE }∪{ di,t ∈ A(hj) | di,t ∈ D−i , vi is FALSE }.
We can observe that |M(d)| = 1 for every doctor d, and M(hi) ∈ F(phi , qhi) for every variable-
hospital hi. Also, because all clauses are satisfied, the above definition implies M(hj) ∈
F(phj , qhj ) for every clause-hospital hj . Then, M is feasible. We now show the envy-freeness of
M . Suppose, to the contrary, di,t has justified envy toward d
′. Because we have |M(di,t)| = 1,
A(di,t) = {hi, hj∗(i,t)}, and hi di,t hj∗(i,t), this justified envy implies conditions d′ ∈ M(hi),
di,t 6∈ M(hi) and M(hi) + di,t − d′ ∈ F(phi , qhi). As M(hi) ∈ F(phi , qhi) = {D+i , D−i }, then we
have {M(hi)+di,t−d′,M(hi)} = {D+i , D−i }, which contradicts |D+i \D−i | = |D−i \D+i | = 2.
4 Envy-freeness in CSM with Paramodular Quotas
In Section 3, we showed that it is NP-hard in general to decide whether a CSM instance has
an envy-free matching or not. This section shows that the problem is solvable in polynomial
time if the pair of quota functions is paramodular for each hospital. The proofs of the theorems
and corollary in this section are provided in the Appendix. We first introduce the notion of
paramodularity [9].
Let A be a finite set and let p, q : 2A → Z. The pair (p, q) is paramodular (or, called a
strong pair [10]) if
• p is supermodular, i.e., p(B) + p(B′) ≤ p(B ∪B′) + p(B ∩B′) for every B,B′ ⊆ A,
• q is submodular, i.e., q(B) + q(B′) ≥ q(B ∪B′) + q(B ∩B′) for every B,B′ ⊆ A, and
• the cross-inequality q(B)− p(B′) ≥ q(B \B′)− p(B′ \B) holds for every B,B′ ⊆ A.
Here we provide examples of constraints that can be represented by paramodular pairs. (See
Yokoi [34, Appendices A and B].)
Example 4.1 (Laminar Constraints). Let L ⊆ 2A be a laminar (or hierarchical) classification
(i.e., any X,Y ⊆ L satisfy X ⊆ Y or X ⊇ Y or X ∩ Y 6= ∅). Let pˆ, qˆ : L → Z be func-
tions that define a lower and an upper quota for each class. Denote the acceptable set family
by J (L, pˆ, qˆ) := {B ⊆ A | ∀X ∈ L : pˆ(X) ≤ |B ∩X| ≤ qˆ(X) }. If J (L, pˆ, qˆ) is nonempty, then
J (L, pˆ, qˆ) = F(p, q) for some paramodular pair (p, q).
Example 4.2 (Staffing Constraints). For a finite set S (e.g., a set of sections of a hospital),
let Γ : S → 2A and lˆ, uˆ : S → Z be functions such that Γ(s) ⊆ A represents members
acceptable to s ∈ S and lˆ(s), uˆ(s) ∈ Z represent a lower and an upper quota of each s ∈ S. Let
J (S,Γ, lˆ, uˆ) ⊆ 2A be a family of subsets B ⊆ A such that there exists a function pi : B → S
satisfying ∀d ∈ B : d ∈ Γ(pi(d)) and ∀s ∈ S : lˆ(s) ≤ | { d ∈ B | pi(d) = s } | ≤ uˆ(s). If J (S,Γ, lˆ, uˆ)
is nonempty, then J (S,Γ, lˆ, uˆ) = F(p, q) for some paramodular pair (p, q).
For a set function p : 2A → Z, its complement p : 2A → Z is defined by
p(B) = p(A)− p(A \B) (B ⊆ A).
Recall that a CSM instance is represented as a tuple (D,H,E,DH , {(ph, qh)}h∈H), where
it is assumed that 0 ≤ ph(B) ≤ qh(B) ≤ |B| for every h ∈ H and B ⊆ A(h). Here is the main
theorem of this section. We denote by 0 a set function that is identically zero.
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Theorem 4.3. For a CSM instance I = (D,H,E,DH , {(ph, qh)}h∈H), suppose that (ph, qh)
is paramodular for each h ∈ H. Then, an instance I ′ = (D,H,E,DH , {(0, ph)}h∈H) has at
least one stable matching and the following three conditions are equivalent.
(a) I has an envy-free matching.
(b) Some stable matching M ′ of I ′ satisfies |M ′(h)| = ph(A(h)) for all h ∈ H.
(c) Every stable matching M ′ of I ′ satisfies |M ′(h)| = ph(A(h)) for all h ∈ H.
Also, if (b) holds, then M ′ is an envy-free matching of I.
As will be shown in Appendix A.4, the existence of a stable matching of I ′ and the equiv-
alence between (b) and (c) follows from Fleiner’s results on the matroid framework [5, 6]. The
most difficult part is showing the equivalence between conditions (a) and (b). To show that (a)
implies (b), we construct a stable matching M ′ of I ′ from an envy-free matching M of I. This
construction is achieved by using the fixed-point method of Fleiner [6]. The paramodularity
of each (ph, qh) (or a generalized matroid structure of each F(ph, qh)) is essential to show the
existence of a fixed-point satisfying a required condition (see Lemma A.16 in Appendix A.4 for
the details).
By Theorem 4.3, when quota function pairs are paramodular, we can decide the existence
of an envy-free matching of I = (D,H,E,DH , {(ph, qh)}h∈H) by the following algorithm.
Step1. Find a stable matching M ′ of I ′ = (D,H,E,DH , {(0, ph)}h∈H).
Step2. If |M ′(h)| = ph(A(h)) for every h ∈ H, then return M ′. Otherwise, return “there is no
envy-free matching.”
As will be shown in the Appendix, Step 1 (i.e., finding a stable matching of I ′) can be done
efficiently by the generalized Gale-Shapley algorithm studied in [5, 6]. The detailed description
of the algorithm is as follows. Here, for each h ∈ H, N ⊆ E, and d ∈ N(h), we use the notation
N(h)hd := { d′ ∈ N(h) | d′ h d } and N(h)hd := { d′ ∈ N(h) | d′ h d or d′ = d }.
Algorithm 1: EF-Paramodular-CSM
Input: I = (D,H,E,DH , {(ph, qh)}h∈H) such that each (ph, qh) is paramodular
Output: return an envy-free matching M ′, or “there is no envy-free matching.”
Set ND ← E, NH ← ∅, and let M ′ be undefined;
while M ′ is undefined do
RD ←
⋃
d∈D { (d, h) | h ∈ ND(d), h 6= maxd ND(d) };
RH ←
⋃
h∈H { (d, h) | d ∈ NH(h), p(A(h) \NH(h)hd) = p(A(h) \NH(h)hd) };
if (ND, NH) = (E \RH , E \RD) then
let M ′ ← ND ∩NH and break;
else
update (ND, NH)← (E \RH , E \RD);
end
end
if |M ′(h)| = ph(A(h)) for all h ∈ H then
return M ′;
else
return “there is no envy-free matching”;
end
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In the Appendix, we show that the assignment M ′ obtained in the algorithm is indeed
a stable matching of I ′. Also, it will be shown that ND is monotone decreasing and NH is
monotone increasing in the algorithm, and hence the “while loop” is iterated at most 2|E|
times. Thus, we obtain the following theorem. (See Appendix A.5 for the details.)
Theorem 4.4. For a CSM instance I = (D,H,E,DH , {(ph, qh)}h∈H) such that each (ph, qh)
is paramodular, the algorithm EF-Paramodular-CSM decides whether I has an envy-free matching
or not in O(|E|2) time, provided that evaluation oracles of {ph}h∈H are available.
As is shown in Examples 4.1 and 4.2, when the family of acceptable doctor sets of each
hospital h ∈ H is defined by a laminar constraint Jh := J (Lh, pˆh, qˆh) or by a staffing constraint
Jh := J (Sh,Γh, lˆh, uˆh), then there is a paramodular pair (ph, qh) such that Jh = F(ph, qh).
The following corollary states that, in such a case, we can decide the existence of an envy-free
matching of I = (D,H,E,DH , {(ph, qh)}h∈H) even if evaluation oracles of {ph}h∈H are not
provided.
Corollary 4.5. Suppose that, for each h ∈ H, the family of acceptable doctor sets is defined
in the form Jh := J (Lh, pˆh, qˆh) 6= ∅ (resp., Jh := J (Sh,Γh, lˆh, uˆh) 6= ∅). Let (ph, qh) be a
paramodular pair such that Jh = F(ph, qh). Then, given Lh, pˆh, qˆh (resp., Sh,Γh, lˆh, uˆh) for each
h ∈ H, one can decide whether I = (D,H,E,DH , {(ph, qh)}h∈H) has an envy-free matching
or not in time polynomial in |E| (resp., in |E| and maxh∈H |Sh|).
Proof. Since we have Theorem 4.4, it completes the proof to show that we can simulate an
evaluation oracle of each ph in time polynomial in |E| (resp., in |E| and |Sh|). By Proposition A.1
in Appendix A.1, for each B ⊆ A(h), the value of ph(B) is obtained as ph(B) = min{ |X ∩B| |
X ∈ Jh}. Consider a weight function wB on A(h) such that wB(d) = 1 for every d ∈ B and
wB(d) = 0 for every d ∈ A(h) \B. Then, ph(B) is written as ph(B) = min {wB(X) | X ∈ Jh },
which is a weight minimization problem on a generalized matroid. As explained in [34, Appendix
C], when Jh is given in the form above, this can be reduced to the minimum cost circulation
problem, which can be solved in strongly polynomial time [32, 26]. (See [34] for the details of
the reduction.) Thus, the proof is completed.
Remark 4.6. Theorems 4.3 and 4.4 generalize Theorems 2.6 and 2.7 as follows. For a pair
(lh, uh) of nonnegative integers with 0 ≤ uh ≤ lh ≤ |A(h)|, define ph, qh : 2A(h) → Z by
ph(B) = max{0, lh − |A(h) \B|}, qh(B) = min{uh, |B|}, (B ⊆ A(h)).
Then, (ph, qh) is paramodular and F(ph, qh) = {X ⊆ A(h) | lh ≤ |X| ≤ uh }. Hence, envy-
freeness for (D,H,E,DH , {lh, uh}h∈H) coincides with that for (D,H,E,DH , {ph, qh}h∈H).
Also, we can check ph(A(h)) = max{0, lh − |A(h) \A(h)|} = lh.
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A Proofs for Section 4
Here, we provide proofs of Theorems 4.3, 4.4. This section consists of five subsections, and the
first three introduce notions and previous results needed for the proofs. More precisely, Sec-
tions A.1, A.2, and A.3 respectively introduce notions of generalized matroids, choice functions
induced from matroids, and the lattice fixed-point method for stable matchings. Using them,
the last two subsections provide the proofs of our results.
A.1 Generalized Matroids
For a finite set A and a family J ⊆ 2A, the pair (A,J ) is called a generalized matroid [31]
(g-matroid, for short) if J is nonempty and satisfies the following property called simulta-
neous (or symmetric) exchange property2 [25].
(B\-EXC) For any X,Y ∈ J and e ∈ X \ Y , we have
(i) X − e ∈ J , Y + e ∈ J or
(ii) there exists some e′ ∈ Y \X such that X − e+ e′ ∈ J , Y + e− e′ ∈ J .
The family J of a g-matroid (A,J ) is also called an M\-convex family [23, 24]. (There are
various characterizations for g-matroids. See, e.g., Tardos [31], Frank [9] and Murota [23] for
more information on g-matroid and its extensions.)
For set functions p, q : 2A → Z, the pair (p, q) is called g-matroidal if it is paramodular and
satisfies 0 ≤ p(B) ≤ q(B) ≤ |B| for every B ⊆ A. As its name indicates, there is a one-to-one
correspondence between generalized matroids and g-matroidal pairs (see, e.g., [9, 10]).
Proposition A.1. A pair (A,J ) is a g-matroid if and only if J = F(p, q) for some g-matroidal
pair (p, q). Such a g-matroidal pair is uniquely defined by
p(B) = min{ |X ∩B| | X ∈ J } (B ⊆ A),
q(B) = max{ |X ∩B| | X ∈ J } (B ⊆ A).
By Proposition A.1, the families J (L, pˆ, qˆ) and J (S,Γ, lˆ, uˆ) defined in Examples 4.1 and
4.2 are the independent set families of g-matroids. (See Yokoi [34, Appendices A and B] for
examples and operations of g-matroids.)
A function r : 2A → Z is called a matroid rank function if it is submodular, monotone
(i.e., B ⊆ B′ ⊆ A implies r(B) ≤ r(B′)), and satisfies 0 ≤ r(B) ≤ |B| for every B ⊆ A. The
submodularity of r is equivalent to the following diminishing returns property: for any
B′ ⊆ B ⊆ A and e ∈ A \B, we have
r(B + e)− r(B) ≤ r(B′ + e)− r(B′).
In particular, a matroid rank function satisfies 0 ≤ r(B+ e)− r(B) ≤ r({e})− r(∅) ≤ 1 for any
B ⊆ A and e ∈ A \B.
A pair (A, I) is called a matroid if it is a g-matroid and ∅ ∈ I. In terms of quota functions,
a pair (A, I) is a matroid if there is a matroid rank function r such that I = F(0, r). Indeed,
we can check that the pair (0, r) is g-matroidal for any matroid rank function r.
2This is not the original definition of generalized matroids by Tardos [31], but equivalent to it as shown by
Murota and Shioura [25].
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A.2 Choice Functions Induced from Matroid Rank Functions
Let r : 2A → Z be a matroid rank function on A and  be a linear order on A. LetM = (A, r,)
and define a function CM : 2
A → 2A as follows. Let n = |A| and, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, let ei be
the i-th best element of A with respect to , i.e. e1  e2  · · ·  en. Let A0 := ∅ and
Ai := {e1, e2, . . . , ei} for each i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Then, define CM by
CM (X) := { ei ∈ X | r(Ai ∩X) > r(Ai−1 ∩X) } (X ⊆ A).
We call CM the choice function induced fromM = (A, r,). Note that, for any ei ∈ A and
X ⊆ A, the value of r(Ai ∩X)− r(Ai−1 ∩X) is 1 or 0 by the monotonicity and submodularity
of r. Also, ei ∈ A \X implies r(Ai ∩X)− r(Ai−1 ∩X) = 0. Then, for any X ⊆ A, we have
CM (X) = { ei ∈ A | r(Ai ∩X)− r(Ai−1 ∩X) = 1 } , (1)
X \ CM (X) = { ei ∈ X | r(Ai ∩X)− r(Ai−1 ∩X) = 0 } . (2)
Such a choice function was introduced by Fleiner [5, 6] and used in several works [3, 7, 34]. In
these works, matroids are usually given by independent set families rather than matroid rank
functions. The following propositions (Propositions A.2–A.6) are known facts, but we provide
alternative proofs in terms of matroid rank functions.
Proposition A.2. For any X ⊆ A, we have CM (X) ∈ F(0, r).
Proof. It suffices to show |CM (X) ∩B| ≤ r(B) for any B ⊆ A. By (1), we have CM (X) ∩B =
{ ei ∈ A | r(Ai ∩X)− r(Ai−1 ∩X) = 1, ei ∈ B }. For any ei ∈ B, since Ai−1∩X∩B ⊆ Ai−1∩X
and Ai ∩X ∩B = (Ai−1 ∩X ∩B) + ei, the diminishing returns property of r implies
r(Ai ∩X)− r(Ai−1 ∩X) ≤ r(Ai ∩X ∩B)− r(Ai−1 ∩X ∩B).
Thus, ei ∈ B, r(Ai ∩ X) − r(Ai−1 ∩ X) = 1 imply r(Ai ∩ X ∩ B) − r(Ai−1 ∩ X ∩ B) = 1.
Therefore,
|CM (X) ∩B| = | { ei ∈ A | r(Ai ∩X)− r(Ai−1 ∩X) = 1, ei ∈ B } |
≤ | { ei ∈ A | r(Ai ∩X ∩B)− r(Ai−1 ∩X ∩B) = 1 } |
=
∑
i:1≤i≤n[ r(Ai ∩X ∩B)− r(Ai−1 ∩X ∩B) ] = r(X ∩B).
The monotonicity of r implies r(X ∩B) ≤ r(B), and the proof is completed.
Proposition A.3. For every X ⊆ A and j = 1, 2, . . . , n, we have |CM (X) ∩ Aj | = r(Aj ∩X).
In particular, |CM (X)| = r(X).
Proof. By (1), CM (X)∩Aj = { ei ∈ Aj | r(Ai ∩X)− r(Ai−1 ∩X) = 1 }. This implies |CM (X)∩
Ai| =
∑
i:1≤i≤j [ r(Ai ∩X)− r(Ai−1 ∩X) ] = r(Aj ∩X)− r(A0 ∩X) = r(Aj ∩X).
Proposition A.4. CM is substitutable, i.e., X ⊆ Y ⊆ A implies X \CM (X) ⊆ Y \CM (Y ).
Proof. Suppose that ei ∈ X \CM (X) for some i. This implies r(Ai ∩X)− r(Ai−1 ∩X) = 0 by
(2). By the diminishing returns property and X ⊆ Y , the value of r(Ai ∩ Y ) − r(Ai−1 ∩ Y ) is
also 0, and hence ei ∈ Y \ CM (Y ) by (2).
Proposition A.5. CM is size-monotone, i.e., X ⊆ Y ⊆ A implies |CM (X)| ≤ |CM (Y )|.
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Proof. This immediately follows from Proposition A.3 and the monotonicity of r.
Proposition A.6. For any X ⊆ A, the set CM (X) dominates every element in X \CM (X).
That is, the following two hold.
• For every e ∈ X \ CM (X), we have CM (X) + e 6∈ F(0, r).
• For every e ∈ X \ CM (X) and e′ ∈ CM (X), if e  e′, then CM (X) + e− e′ 6∈ F(0, r).
Proof. Let i be the index such that e = ei, i.e., e is the i-th best element for . By Proposi-
tion A.3, we have |CM (X)∩Ai| = r(Ai∩X). With CM (X) ⊆ X and ei ∈ X\CM (X), this implies
|(CM (X) + ei) ∩ (Ai ∩X)| = |CM (X) ∩Ai|+ 1 > r(Ai ∩X), and hence CM (X) + ei 6∈ F(0, r).
For the second claim, let i′ be the index such that e′ = ei′ . Then, e  e′ implies i < i′, and
hence ei′ 6∈ Ai. This yields |(CM (X) + ei − ei′) ∩ (Ai ∩X)| = |CM (X) ∩ Ai| + 1 > r(Ai ∩X),
which implies CM (X) + ei − ei′ 6∈ F(0, r).
A.3 Fixed-point Method for Stable Matchings on Matroids
Here we introduce the lattice fixed-point framework for stable matchings on matroids, studied
by Fleiner [5, 6] (see also Hatfield and Milgrom [17]).
Let I = (D,H,E,DH , {0, rh}h∈H) be a CSM instance such that rh is a matroid rank
function for each h ∈ H. That is, each hospital has a matroidal upper quota function and no
lower quota.
From (D,E, {d}d∈D), we define doctors’ joint choice function CD : 2E → 2E . For any set
N ⊆ E, let CD(N) be the set of each doctor’s best choices among N , i.e.,
CD(N) :=
⋃
d∈D { (d, h) | h ∈ N(d), h = maxd N(d) } (N ⊆ E).
From (H,E, {h}h∈H , {rh}h∈H), we define hospitals’ joint choice function CH : 2E → 2E . First,
for each hospital h ∈ H, let Ch : 2A(h) → 2A(h) be a choice function induced from (A(h), rh,h)
as in Section A.2. Then, define CH by
CH(N) :=
⋃
h∈H { (d, h) | d ∈ N(h), d ∈ Ch(N(h)) } (N ⊆ E).
Define rejection functions RD, RH : 2
E → 2E by
RD(N) = N \ CD(N), RH(N) = N \ CH(N) (N ⊆ E),
and a function FI : 2
E × 2E → 2E × 2E by
FI(ND, NH) = (E \RH(NH), E \RD(ND)) (ND, NH ⊆ E).
Proposition A.7 (Fleiner [5, 6]). For I = (D,H,E,DH , {0, rh}h∈H) such that each rh is a
matroid rank function, if (ND, NH) is a fixed-point of FI , then ND∩NH = CD(ND) = CH(NH)
holds and ND ∩NH is a stable matching of I.
Let ≥ be a partial order defined on 2E × 2E as
(ND, NH) ≥ (N ′D, N ′H) ⇐⇒ [ND ⊇ N ′D, NH ⊆ N ′H ]
Recall that Ch is substitutable for each h ∈ H, This implies the following property of FI .
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Proposition A.8 (Fleiner [5, 6]). For I = (D,H,E,DH , {0, rh}h∈H) such that each rh is a
matroid rank function, the function FI is monotone with respect to ≥. That is, (ND, NH) ≥
(N ′D, N
′
H) implies FI(ND, NH) ≥ FI(N ′D, N ′H).
The monotonicity of FI implies the existence of a stable matching as follows.
Proposition A.9 (Fleiner [5, 6]). Let I = (D,H,E,DH , {0, rh}h∈H) be an instance such that
each rh is a matroid rank function. One can find a stable matching in O(|E| · EODH) time,
where EODH is a time to compute CD(N) and CH(N) for any N ⊆ E.
Proof. Since (E, ∅) is the maximum in 2E × 2E with respect to ≥, we have (E, ∅) ≥ FI(E, ∅).
As FI is monotone by Proposition A.8, then
(E, ∅) ≥ FI(E, ∅) ≥ FI(FI(E, ∅)) ≥ · · · ≥ F kI (E, ∅) ≥ · · · .
Since 2E × 2E is a finite lattice whose longest chain is of length 2|E|, we have F kI (E, ∅) =
FI(F
k
I (E, ∅)) for some k ≤ 2|E|. Then, (N∗D, N∗H) := F kI (E, ∅) is a fixed-point of FI and, by
Proposition A.7, N∗D ∩N∗H is a stable matching of I.
Fleiner also provided the following structural result on the set of stable matchings.
Proposition A.10 (Fleiner [5, 6]). Let I = (D,H,E,DH , {0, rh}h∈H) be an instance such
that each rh is a matroid rank function. For any two stable matchings M,M
′ ⊆ E of I and any
hospital h ∈ H, we have |M(h)| = |M ′(h)|.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 4.3
We are now ready to show Theorem 4.3. Recall that I and I ′ are defined as
I = (D,H,E,DH , {(ph, qh)}h∈H),
I ′ = (D,H,E,DH , {(0, ph)}h∈H),
where (ph, qh) is g-matroidal (i.e., is paramodular and satisfies 0 ≤ ph(B) ≤ qh(B) ≤ |B|) for
each h ∈ H. Here, ph is the complement of ph defined as ph(B) = ph(A(h)) − ph(A(h) \ B).
Observe the following basic fact of a g-matroidal pair.
Claim A.11. ph is a matroid rank function and ph(A(h)) = ph(A(h)) for each h ∈ H.
Proof. Since (ph, qh) is g-matroidal, ph is supermodular and 0 ≤ ph(B) ≤ |B| for every B ⊆
A(h). Then, for any B′ ⊆ B ⊆ A(h), we have ph(B′) ≤ ph(B′) + ph(B \B′) ≤ ph(B) + ph(∅) =
ph(B), i.e., ph is monotone. Then, ph is submodular, monotone, and 0 ≤ ph(B) ≤ |B| for
every B ⊆ A(h), i.e., ph is a matroid rank function. Also, ph(A(h)) = ph(A(h)) − ph(∅) =
ph(A(h)).
By Claim A.11, Propositions A.9 and A.10 imply the following.
Lemma A.12. I ′ has a stable matching. Also, for any stable matchings M , M ′ of I and any
hospital h ∈ H, we have |M(h)| = |M ′(h)|.
Lemma A.12 implies that I ′ has a stable matching and that conditions (b) and (c) in
Theorem 4.3 are equivalent.
What is left is to show that the condition (a) is also equivalent. For this purpose, we prepare
the following three claims. The first and second claims are basic facts of paramodular functions
[9]. The third one utilizes the exchange property of g-matroids (M\-convex families).
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Claim A.13. For any h ∈ H and X ⊆ A(h), suppose that |X| = ph(A(h)) = ph(A) holds.
Then, we have X ∈ F(0, ph) if and only if X ∈ F(ph, qh).
Proof. We abbreviate ph, qh, A(h) to p, q, A, respectively, and denote B := A \B for B ⊆ A.
To show the “if” part, suppose X ∈ F(p, q). Then |X ∩ B| ≥ p(B) for any B ⊆ A. Since
|X| = p(A), then |X ∩B| = |X| − |X ∩B| ≤ p(A)− p(B) = p(B). Thus, X ∈ F(0, p).
To show the “only if” part, suppose X ∈ F(0, p). We show p(B) ≤ |X ∩B| ≤ q(B) for any
B ⊆ A. By the cross-inequality q(B)−p(A) ≥ q(B \A)−p(A\B), we have q(B) ≥ p(A)−p(B),
which implies |X ∩ B| ≤ p(B) = p(A) − p(B) ≤ q(B), and thus |X ∩ B| ≤ q(B). Also, since
|X∩B| ≤ p(B) = p(A)−p(B), we have |X∩B| = |X|−|X∩B| ≥ p(A)−(p(A)−p(B)) = p(B).
Thus, |X ∩B| ≥ p(B).
Since ph is a matroid rank function for each h ∈ H, we can define the choice function
Ch : 2
A(h) → 2A(h) induced from (A(h), ph,h) as in Section A.3.
Claim A.14. For any h ∈ H, let Ch be the choice function induced from (A(h), ph,h). For
Y ⊆ A(h) if there exists X ∈ F(ph, qh) such that X ⊆ Y , then |Ch(Y )| = ph(A(h)).
Proof. We abbreviate ph, qh, A(h), Ch to p, q, A, C, respectively.
By Proposition A.2, C(Y ) ∈ F(0, p), and hence |C(Y )| = |C(Y ) ∩ A| ≤ p(A). Also,
Propositions A.3 and A.5 implies p(X) = |C(X)| ≤ |C(Y )|. Since X ∈ F(p, q), we have
0 ≤ p(A \ X) ≤ |X ∩ (A \ X)| = 0, and hence p(X) = p(A) − p(A \ X) = p(A) = p(A).
Combining these yields p(A) ≤ |C(X)| ≤ p(A), and hence |C(X)| = p(A) = p(A).
Claim A.15. For any h ∈ H, let Ch be the choice function induced from (A(h), ph,h). Suppose
that X,Y ⊆ A(h) satisfy
• X ∈ F(ph, qh) and X ⊆ Y , and
• for every d ∈ Y \X and d′ ∈ X, if d h d′, then X + d− d′ 6∈ F(ph, qh).
Then, Ch(Y ) ⊆ X.
Proof. We abbreviate ph, qh, A(h), Ch to p, q, A, C, respectively.
By Claim A.14, X ∈ F(p, q) and X ⊆ Y imply |C(Y )| = p(A) = p(A). Also, C(Y ) ∈ F(0, p)
by Proposition A.2. Then, Claim A.13 implies C(Y ) ∈ F(p, q). Thus, X,C(Y ) ∈ F(p, q).
Suppose, to the contrary, C(Y ) ( X. Then there is some d ∈ C(Y ) \ X. By the symmetric
exchange axiom (B\-EXC) for C(X), Y , and d, we have either (i) C(Y )− d, X + d ∈ F(p, q),
or (ii) ∃d′ ∈ X \ C(Y ) : C(Y ) − d + d′, X + d − d′ ∈ F(p, q). Note that (i) cannot hold since
C(Y )− d 6∈ F(p, q) follows from |C(Y )− d| < |C(Y )| = p(A). Then, (ii) holds, i.e., there exists
d′ ∈ X \ C(Y ) such that C(Y )− d+ d′, X + d− d′ ∈ F(p, q).
By d ∈ C(Y ) \ X ⊆ Y \ X and d′ ∈ X and X + d − d′ ∈ F(p, q) the assumption on Y
implies d′ h d. On the other hand, by |C(Y ) − d + d′| = |C(Y )| = p(A), Proposition A.13
and C(Y ) − d + d′ ∈ F(p, q) imply C(Y ) − d + d′ ∈ F(0, p). As d ∈ C(Y ) \ X ⊆ C(Y ) and
d′ ∈ X \ C(Y ) ⊆ Y \ C(Y ), this implies d h d′ by Proposition A.6, a contradiction.
We now complete the proof of Theorem 4.3 by showing the following lemma, which states
the equivalence between conditions (a) and (b) in Theorem 4.3.
Lemma A.16. I has an envy-free matching if and only if some stable matching M ′ of I ′
satisfies |M ′(h)| = ph(A(h)) for all h ∈ H.
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Proof. The “if” part: Let M ′ be a stable matching of I ′ such that |M ′(h)| = ph(A(h)) for all
h ∈ H. We show that M ′ is also an envy-free matching of I.
As M ′ is feasible for I ′, we have |M ′(d)| ≤ 1 for every d ∈ D and M ′(h) ∈ F(0, ph) for
every h ∈ H. By Claim A.13 and |M ′(h)| = ph(A(h)), then M ′(h) ∈ F(ph, qh), and hence
M ′ is also a matching in I. Suppose, to the contrary, that there is a doctor d ∈ D who has
justified envy toward d′ ∈ D with M ′(d′) = h. Then, (i) d is unassigned or h h M ′(d) and
(ii) M ′(h) + d− d′ ∈ F(ph, qh) and d h d′. Note that |M ′(h) + d− d′| = |M ′(h)| = ph(A(h)).
Then, Claim A.13 implies M ′(h) + d− d′ ∈ F(0, ph). This means that (d, h) is a blocking pair
for M ′ in I ′, a contradiction.
The “only if” part: Suppose that I has an envy-free matching M . We now construct a
stable matching M ′ of I ′ satisfying |M ′(h)| = ph(A(h)) for all h ∈ H.
For I ′ = (D,H,E,DH , {(0, ph)}h∈H), define CD, CH : 2E → 2E as in Section A.3. That
is, CD returns the set of each doctor’s best choices and CH is defined by combining {Ch}h∈H ,
where Ch is induced from (A(h), ph,h). From CD and CH , we define FI′ : 2E × 2E → 2E × 2E
as in Section A.3. Define two supersets ND, NH ⊆ E of M by
ND := M ∪ { (d, h) ∈ E \M |M(d) d h } ,
NH := M ∪ (E \ND).
Note that NH \M = E \ND, and hence every (d, h) ⊆ NH \M satisfies (d, h) 6∈ ND, and
hence h d M(d). Since M is an envy-free matching, then for every d′ ∈M(h) with d h d′ we
have M(h) + d− d′ 6∈ F(ph, qh), since otherwise d has justified envy toward d′. Thus, we have
• M(h) ∈ F(ph, qh) and M(h) ⊆ NH(h), and
• for every d ∈ NH(h) \M(h) and d′ ∈M(h), if d h d′, then M(h) + d− d′ 6∈ F(ph, qh).
Claim A.15 then implies Ch(NH(h)) ⊆M(h) for each h ∈ H, and hence CH(NH) ⊆M .
E \RH(NH) = (E \NH) ∪ CH(NH) ⊆ (E \NH) ∪M = ND. (3)
Also, by the definition of CD and ND, we have CD(ND) = M , which implies
E \RD(ND) = (E \ND) ∪ CD(ND) = (E \ND) ∪M = NH . (4)
Recall the partial order ≥ defined on 2E × 2E in Section A.3. By (3) and (4), we have
(ND, NH) ≥ (E \RH(NH), E \RD(ND)) = FI′(ND, NH).
Since FI′ is monotone by Proposition A.8, this implies
(ND, NH) ≥ FI′(ND, NH) ≥ FI′(FI′(ND, NH)) ≥ · · · ≥ F kI′(ND, NH) ≥ · · · ,
and hence there is k such that F kI′(ND, NH) is a fixed-point of FI′ . Denote it by (N
k
D, N
k
D) and
define M ′ := CH(NkH). By Proposition A.7, M
′ is a stable matching of I ′.
What is left is to show |M ′(h)| = ph(A(h)) for all h ∈ H. Since (ND, NH) ≥ F kI′(ND, NH) =
(NkD, N
k
D), we have NH ⊆ NkH , Then M ⊆ CH(NH) ⊆ NH ⊆ NkH , and hence M(h) ⊆ NkH(h)
for each h ∈ H. By M(h) ∈ F(ph, qh) and Claim A.14, |M ′(h)| = |Ch(NkH(h))| = ph(A(h)).
Combining Lemmas A.12 and A.16 completes the proof of Theorem 4.3.
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A.5 Proof of Theorem 4.4
We first show that the “while loop” of the algorithm EF-Paramodular-CSM computes a stable
matching of I ′ = (D,H,E,DH , {(0, ph)}h∈H). By the proof of Proposition A.9, it suffices to
show that, each iteration updates (ND, NH) to FI′(ND, NH). That is, we show that the subsets
RD and RH defined as
RD :=
⋃
d∈D { (d, h) | h ∈ ND(d), h 6= maxd ND(d) } ,
RH :=
⋃
h∈H { (d, h) | d ∈ NH(h), ph(A(h) \NH(h)hd) = ph(A(h) \NH(h)hd) }
coincide with ND \ CD(ND) and NH \ CH(NH), respectively, where CD and CH are defined
for I ′ as in Section A.3. By definition, RD = ND \ CD(ND) can be checked easily. To show
RH = NH \ CH(NH), recall the definition of CH in Section A.3.
CH(N) =
⋃
h∈H { (d, h) | d ∈ N(h), d ∈ Ch(N(h)) } (N ⊆ E).
Here, each Ch : 2
A(h) → 2A(h) is a choice function induced from (A(h), ph,h). By definitions
of Ch and ph, for any N ⊆ E, we have
Ch(N(h)) = { d ∈ N(h) | ph(N(h)hd) > ph(N(h)hd) } ,
= { d ∈ N(h) | ph(A(h) \N(h)hd) < ph(A(h) \N(h)hd) } .
By the monotonicity of ph (shown in the proof of Claim A.11), for any d ∈ N(h), we have
ph(A(h) \N(h)hd) ≤ ph(A(h) \N(h)hd). Then, for any h ∈ H, N ⊆ E, and d ∈ N(h),
d ∈ N(h) \ Ch(N(h)) ⇐⇒ ph(A(h) \N(h)hd) = ph(A(h) \N(h)hd).
Thus, we have RH = NH \ CH(NH).
We now analyze the time complexity. As shown in the proof of Proposition A.9, a stable
matching is found by computing FI′ at most 2|E| times, i.e., the “while loop” is iterated O(|E|)
times. Also, we see that each iteration can be done in O(|E|) time. Checking the condition
|M ′(h)| = ph(A(h)) (h ∈ H) is done in O(|E|) time. Thus, the algorithm runs in O(|E|2) time.
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